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We show that a side-channel-free (SCF) source does not have to be an ideal source by introducing
the idea of mapping from ideal source. We propose a 3-state no-touch protocol for quantum key
distribution (QKD) where Alice and Bob does not modulate any light sent out, the only thing the
do is to send (or not send, in sending-or-not protocol). The reference light are from independent
Lasers. We show that, the protocol is side-channel-free (i.e., both source side channel free and
measurement device independent) and there is no modulation to the weak beams for QKD coding,
except for sending or not sending. Calculation shows that one can reach a side-channel-free secure
distance over 300 km using only coherent-state source. We use worst-case analysis which takes
no limitation to the channel or detection loss for security. Our protocol is immune to all adverse
due to side channels such as the photon frequency spectrum, emission time, propagation direction,
spatial angular moment, and so on. Numerical simulations show that our scheme can reach a
side-channel-free result for quantum key distribution over a distance longer than 200 km given the
single-photon-interference misalignment error rate of 30%, and a distance longer than 300 km given
the single-photon-interference misalignment error rate of 10%. Our no-touch idea can also apply
to phase-coding twin-field QKD protocols. The no-touch idea also applies to twin-field QKD with
phase coding.
Introduction Quantum key distribution (QKD) can
provide unconditional security based on the laws of quan-
tum physics [1, 2] even though Eve can completely control
the channel. However, in practice[3–11], there are side-
channel effects due to the device imperfections. Even
though a perfect single-photon source is applied, there
are still some side-channel effects which can be disas-
trous to the security. For example, there could be basis-
dependent synchronization errors in pulse emitting and
Eve can make use of this to judge the basis of the emit-
ted pulse. In general, all pulses are living in an infi-
nite dimensional space. Though we use the coding space
(e.g., polarization) for QKD, Eve can do his attack in
another space such as frequency space to obtain informa-
tion. Although one can prepare all coding states using
one diode, the problem is still there because one needs
modulate the different states in coding space. This can
lead to state difference in other spaces, and Eve can make
use of this to obtain information without disturbing the
quantum states in coding space. As we shall show latter,
given a lossy channel, by taking side channel attacks to
the source, Eve can actually almost obtain full informa-
tion of a QKD result without disturbing the states. In
this letter, we show how to efficiently solve this issue.
We propose a scheme to realize the side-channel-free 3-
state source. Applying our proposed source scheme to
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a measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD),
we can have a side-channel attack free QKD protocol
for both the source and measurement device. Although
some existing protocols can also achieve the goal of side-
channel-free security [14, 15], our protocol presented here
is the only one that bases on the easy coherent states and
there is no demanding on the local detection efficiency as
was requested in the entanglement based protocol.
Side-channel attack. Suppose we use a two-basis QKD
protocol, such as the BB84 protocol and the 3-state pro-
tocol, where there are X basis and Z basis in the pro-
tocol. Suppose we use the photon polarization for the
coding space. In the existing methods in generating
the different coding states, we need either use different
diodes to generate different coding states or use only one
diode together with randomly chosen modulations, such
as flipping, rotation, phase shift, etc. Any of these op-
erations can cause differences in the space beyond the
coding space. We consider such type of side-channel ef-
fects. Suppose the frequency spectrums are a little bit
different for different coding states or different bases. In
principle, by detecting frequency difference, Eve has a
chance to know the state in coding space almost exactly
without disturbing the photon states in coding space.
As another example, if different coding states are actu-
ally emitted at different time, Eve may just measure the
photon with a very precise clock and she can sometimes
know the coding state almost exactly if the photon wave
packet collapses at certain time intervals. Also, Eve may
make use of the channel loss, she can choose to block all
2those photons on which the side-channel attack done by
her is not successful. Thus, small bias of a qubit in the
whole space may flaw the whole protocol.
Therefore, to make the source side-channel-free, we
need a no-touch protocol: sending all states by the same
device and not touching anything sent out. Here we pro-
pose our no-touch protocol where all light are sent by the
same device and no onetouches any light sent out, nei-
ther the weak beam not the strong reference light. We
shall use the idea of mapping.
Definitions. For ease of presentation, we first define
a source. For an ideal 3-state [16, 17] source P , every
output is one from three ideal states in set
{|z0〉, |z1〉, |x+〉 = 1
2
(|z0〉+ |z1〉)} (1)
where, |z0〉 and |z1〉 are exactly orthogonal to each in cod-
ing space (such as the polarization), but they are identi-
cal in all other spaces. States |z0〉 and |z1〉 are normally
regarded as in Z basis and |x+〉 is regarded as in X ba-
sis. They are all single-photon states. The probability
distribution for each states is constant,
pz/2, pz/2, px = 1− pz. (2)
In our paper, we shall consider the whole space state for
the real-life source. We define a real-life source in this
way: At any time i, the output state is one element of
the set
Si = {|Z0〉, |Z1〉, |X+〉} (3)
with constant probability distribution
P (Si) = {pz/2, pz/2, px = 1− pz}. (4)
Note that the states can be time dependent, i.e., at dif-
ferent time i, the elements in set Si can be different.
We name this Si above characteristic set for the source.
We name the probability distribution P (Si) character-
istic probability distribution. Two sources are identical
if their characteristic sets and characteristic probabil-
ity distributions are identical. By this definition, we
have actually defined a source by its characteristic set
and characteristic probability distribution. Straightly, an
ideal source can also be defined in this way.
States emitted from the ideal source are always strictly
the ones requested by the theoretical protocol. These
states should be identical to the requested ones in coding
space and they should be strictly identical to each other
in other spaces. For example, if we use the polarization
space for coding, all states should have the identical fre-
quency spectrum. If we use the ideal BB84 source or the
ideal 3-state source there will be no side-channel effect of
the source and the MDI-QKD will be completely secure.
Unfortunately, the so called ideal source does not exist
in real-life world. To make a side-channel free source, we
should not depend on making and ideal source techni-
cally. We should use the idea of mapping.
The idea of mapping from secure source. Fortunately,
the ideal source is not the only secure source. A real-life
source is secure if it can be mapped from an ideal source.
We say that a real-life source S can be mapped from an
ideal source P , if there is a quantum process M under
which the characteristic set and the characteristic proba-
bility distribution of the ideal source can be transformed
to the ones of the real-life source S.
Theorem 1. If the (virtual) source P is secure, then the
real-life source S is also secure if there exists a quantum
processM that can map source P to source S. The final
key of a QKD protocol using source S can be calculate
by assuming that the virtual source P were used.
This conclusion is rather obvious. Suppose S is inse-
cure, then in a QKD protocol where the ideal source P
is applied, Eve can first use the quantum process M to
transform it into source S and then attack the QKD pro-
tocol as if the protocol used source S. This means that
if S is not secure then P is not secure either. Note that,
a real-life source with character set Si can change from
time to time at different time i, it can be regarded as
if the source that the ideal source P is in use provided
there exists a time-dependent map that transforms the
state set in Eq.(1) to set Si.
Consider an example
Theorem 2: A source with characteristic set Si =
{|Z0〉, |Z1〉, |X+〉 = 1√
2
(eiδ0 |Z0〉+eiδ1 |Z1〉)} is side chan-
nel free.
This is because such a source can be mapped from
an ideal source by simple unitary transformation. The
source here is much easier than the ideal source. For
example, we can, at any time first produce a two-mode
state and then randomly determine whether to block any
mode. In our application, we shall use twin field [19] with
the sending-or-not protocol[22].
Note that beyond the coding space, states |Z0〉, |Z1〉
can be different, e.g., different wave shapes, different
propagation directions, different frequency spectrums,
different emission time and so on, each of them can be
even multi-photon states with different photon numbers .
However, since there exists the following (unitary) quan-
tum process
|z0〉 −→ eiδ0 |Z0〉; |z1〉 −→ eiδ1 |Z1〉
that maps the ideal source P into the real source S, the
real source is secure if the ideal source is secure accord-
ing to our Theorem 1. In calculating the secure final
key, we just go ahead to do it as if the ideal source were
applied. Here we have actually assumed |Z0〉 and |Z1〉
orthogonal to each other. This condition is not required
in general because we can use non-trace-preserving maps,
but in our application we don’t need so. The source in
twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD) is a two
mode source and they are always orthogonal in two-mode
photon number space (state |01〉 and |10〉).
Straightly, we also have similar conclusion for a 4-state
source: Theorem 3: A source with characteristic set
3Si = {|Z0〉, |Z1〉, |X±〉 = 1√
2
(eiδ0 |Z0〉 ± eiδ1 |Z1〉)} is side
channel free.
Practical side-channel free QKD using no-touch pro-
tocol. Note that, a side channel free source itself can
not complete the side channel free QKD. We must em-
ploy a protocol which is measurement device indepen-
dent. However, here we can not simply turn to the decoy
state method[6–8], for, we have kept in the mind that
the decoy state single-photon pulse and the signal-state
single-photon pulse are in general different in the whole
space. Hence we can only use weak pulse with worst-
case analysis. Luckily, we can employ the novel idea of
TF-QKD[19] proposed recently followed by a number of
variants[20–22]. There, the channel transmission changes
to square root of normal ones. We consider the following
improved sending-or-not-sending protocol [22].
Lets first consider a virtual 3-state sending-or-not
protocol[22] using the idea of TF-QKD[19]. There are
two parties, Alice and Bob are one party, Eve (Charlie)
is the other party. Say, Alice and Bob initially create a
two-mode state coherent state of
|
√
µ
2
eiρAi〉|
√
µ
2
eiρBi〉 (5)
For this moment we only consider the single-photon state
there
|X+〉 = 1√
2
(eiρBi |Z0〉+ eiρAi |Z1〉)} (6)
where ρAi and ρBi are global phases of the coherent states
of each mode. This is a two-mode state with mode A,
(state |Z1〉 which is state |10〉 in Fock space) controlled
by Alice and mode B (state |Z0〉 which is state |01〉 in
Fock space) controlled by Bob. Obviously, in principle,
there exists an ideal single-photon state | 1√
2
(|z0〉+|z1〉) =
1√
2
(|01〉+|10〉) from which a unitary quantum process can
transform it to state |X+〉 in Eq.(6).
They each then randomly determine to Block or send
her (his) photon or not. And also, they each always send
a strong reference light from another independent laser
device. But they know the phase difference of pulses of
two laser device every time, say δAi for Alice’s side and
δBi at Bob’s side. They can know this by interfering
strong pulses from different laser device. Note that, Alice
or Bob has never touched their weak light beams for QKD
in the whole process, to these weak beams, the only thing
they each need to do is simply sending or not sending.
This completes their real-life source.
To relate our earlier work[22], we consider a unitary
map transforming ideal states |z0〉, |z1〉 to |Z0〉, |Z1〉. We
can just say that they are using a 3-state source with
characteristic set
Y3 = {|z0〉, |z1〉, |x˜+〉 = 1√
2
(eiρBi |z0〉+ eiρAi |z1〉)} (7)
in the QKD protocol, although there is a different real life
source. And they will do post selection by the criterion
1− cos(δAi − δBi) ≤ |λ| (8)
Real protocol . At each time window i, they each first
create a coherent state of intensity µ/2 locally, see in
Eq.(5). No matter whether Alice (Bob) sends her (his)
mode of coherent state, she (he) always sends out the
strong reference light from an independent laser device.
They each know the phase difference between the inde-
pendent laser pulse and the laser pulse for QKD state
coding but Eve does not know. Eve is supposed to
make use the reference light interference information to
do phase compensation to the QKD coding beams before
measure them. At any time i, they each randomly deter-
mine whether it is an X-window or a Z-window. If she
(he) determines an X-window, she (he) will send out her
(his) mode of coherent state for sure. If it is a Z-window,
she (he) with a small probability ǫ decides to send out
her (his) coherent state, and with a probability 1− ǫ not
sending her (his) coherent state. A two-mode state sent
out is called an X-basis state (Z-basis state) if both of
them determine an X-window (Z−window) correspond-
ing to the state. Consider those two-mode states in set
C which are the cases that both of them have determined
a Z-window but only one of them have decided to send.
Any effective events (events that Eve observes only one
detector clicking) corresponding to single-photon states
in set C produces an un-tagged bit in Z-basis.
In the actual case, their initial state is a coherent state
instead of single-photon state. However, if they never an-
nounce the phase information, it is just a classical mix-
ture of different photon-number states. Therefore one
can still use the conclusion of single-photon states with
worst-case analysis as shown in the supplement, based on
the tagged model. In our protocol, they post announce
the phase information of X-basis states only. However,
as was shown in Ref.[22], the tagged model[5] is still valid
given such announcement because they only use Z-basis
bits for key distilltion.
After Charlie announces the measurement outcome,
Alice (Bob) randomly chooses some Z-windows and an-
nounces whether she (he) has sent a coherent state at
that window. The each also announces which windows
have been chosen as X-windows. In this way, they can
know the error rate in both bases.
Nf = n1 − n1H(eph1 )− ntfH(EZ) (9)
Nf : number of final bits, n1: number of bits caused by
single-photon state from set C which includes in those Z
windows when Alice has decided to send while Bob de-
cides not sending or Alice decides not sending while Bob
decides sending. nt: total number of bits, say, for an ef-
fective event, if Alice (Bob) has not sent, she (he) regards
it as bit 0 (1), if she (he) has sent, she (he) regards it as
a bit 1 (0); H(x) = −x log x− (1− x) log(1− x): binary
entropy function, and f : error correction efficiency fac-
tor. EZ : observed error rate of bits caused in Z windows.
eph1 : phase-flip error rate for those n1. (Numbers n1, nt,
should deduct those test bits.) Here eph1 is the single-
photon phase-flip rate in Z basis from C, by worst-case
analysis, as detailed in the supplement. EZ is the bit-flip
4rate. The number of bit-flips is the number of effective
events caused by those cases that both have sent a co-
herent state and the cases that neither has sent anything
in Z-windows.
Security of a 3-state single-photon source based on a
4-state single-photon source. Similar to [18], we can
relate the security of our 3-state single-photon protocol
here to the 4-state single-photon protocol[22]. There, at
any single shot, a set of four candidature state is crested,
as set F4 = {|z0〉, |z1〉, |x˜±〉 = 1√
2
(eiρAi |z0〉 ± eiρBi |z1〉)}.
They can obtain the value for eph1 (E
Z) as requested
in Eq.(20) by directly observing the errors of X-basis
(Z−basis) bits. Definitely, we can choose to realize the
4-state protocol by using a source emitting 3 random sets
of pulses: set F+ contains state |x˜+〉 only, set FX con-
tains state |x˜+〉, |x˜−〉 randomly, and set C1 contains all
states in Z basis. Instead of directly observing the num-
ber of errors in X basis, one can first observe number of
correct counts and wrong counts (counts by different de-
tectors) for set F+, combine this with the total number
of counts by different detectors for states from set FX ,
we can deduce the number of correct counts and wrong
counts for states |x˜+〉 and states |x˜−〉 in set FX . Using
this value, we can continue the protocol for final key dis-
tillation. Note that, in the estimation process, we never
need to know which states in set FX is |x˜+〉 and which
state is |x˜−〉 there. This means, we can replace the states
in set FX by a set of states prepared in Z basis, since the
two sets have the same density operator and Eve cannot
distinguish them. This means, although we have only
used three states, {|z0〉, |z1〉, |x˜+〉}, we can deduce the
error rate in X basis faithfully by worst-case analysis[18]
as shown in the supplement.
In our real protocol, we use coherent states of inten-
sity µ/2 for each side, and also vacuum. We shall then
take the worst-case analysis for n1 and e
ph
1 in Eq.(20) in
the supplement. The numerical results of key rate with
respect to distance is shown in Fig. 1. We have taken
optimized values of sending probability ǫ and intensity
µ/2.
Intensity fluctuation. There could be intensity fluctu-
ation for the laser beams at each side. Say, at each side,
the actual intensity value is µAi/2, µBi/2. Given this, the
virtually post selected single-photon entangled states are
not exactly on the states requested in Theorem 2. This
can be easily fixed by using the idea in [23]: Suppose
µM/2 is the upper bound of the intensities of each side.
We can imagine that at any time i, each side has used
the constant exact intensity µM/2 and then attenuated
to µAi/2 or µBi/2 by channel. We only need to do our
calculation by assuming µM/2 for the source of coherent
state source. Alternatively, one may directly resort it to a
source with a characteristic set Si = {|Z0〉, |Z1〉, |X+〉 =
α|Z0〉 + β|Z1〉}, which can be mapped either from the
source {|z0〉, |z1〉, |x˜+〉 = 1√
2
( α|α |z0〉 + β|β |z1〉)} or from
the source {|z0〉, |z1〉, x+〉 = 1√
2
(|z0〉+|z1〉)} with a non-
trace-preserving map (here |α|2+|β|2 = 1, but |α| 6= |β|).
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FIG. 1: Log scale of the key rate as a function of the distance
between Alice and Bob with different misalignment error rate.
Ea: single-photon misalignment error.
But here we have used coherent state source and we need
to take the worst-case analysis, with assuming another
value of µ in the calculation. These will be reported else
where.
Numerical simulation. Assume detector dark count
rate to be 10−11 with detection efficiency of 80%, a lin-
ear lossy channel with transmittance η = 0.1−L/100km,
and the correction efficiency is f = 1.16. The results of
numerical simulation are shown in Fig. 1.
No-touch protocol with phase-coding TF-QKD Our
no-touch idea can obviously apply to phase-coding
protocols[20, 21] of TF-QKD[19]. Say, instead of sepa-
rate the random phase shift and coding phase shift, at
any time, Alice (Bob) just send a reference light from an
independent Laser device with her weak light beam for
QKD coding. They can know the the phase difference
value between the strong reference light and the weak
light for QKD coding by detecting the interference of
strong pulses phase-locked with them. They remember
this value rA, rB . If there is a count, Alice will ran-
domly announce R = rA or R = r
′
A = rA ± π, (both
rA, r
′
A should be in [0, 2π), this determines the + or −
in r′A). Bob will, take post-selection by a phase-slice cri-
terion similar to Eq.(8) To a post-selected event, a bit
value 0 or 1 is created dependent on Alice has chosen to
announce rA or riA. It should be interesting to study
whether the no-touch phase-coding protocols can also be
side-channel-free.
Concluding Remarks. We have proposed a no-touch
QKD protocol with a 3-state source. We show that this
protocol side-channel-free, i.e., both source side-channel-
free and measurement device independent. We present
general conditions with theorems for side channel free 3-
state source. Our protocol is immune to all adverse due
to side channels such as the photon frequency spectrum,
emission time, propagation direction, spatial angular mo-
5ment, and so on. Our result here is side-channel-free
but not entirely device-independent. It’s security still
depends on some conditions, such as the randomness in
deciding sending or not, the lower bound of fraction of
single-photons and vacuums of coherent states, and the
randomness of the global phase in a coherent state.
Appendix: worst-case analysis
single-photon case Consider a random subset of |x˜+〉
states we have sent, F+. Suppose there are N˜+ elements
for set F+. Consider a random subset FZ for Z basis
states including 2N˜+ states. States in subset set Fz can
be regarded as that they had been prepared in X basis
with half of them in state |x˜+〉 and half of them in state
|x˜−〉. We don’t directly observe the error rate in X basis
in set FZ (because we have no way to do so). But we can
deduce it by the observed results on set F+ and set FZ .
They are:
{n˜+0, n˜+1}; {n˜Z0, n˜Z1} (10)
where, n˜+0, n˜+1 are the numbers of detected correct out-
come (detected by detector D0) and wrong outcome (de-
tected by detector D1) for states in F+; n˜Z0, n˜Z1 are the
number of events detected by detector D0, D1, respec-
tively for states in set FZ . Note that we define a correct
detected event in X basis by this: Detector D0 clicks for
a state originally prepared in state |x+〉 or detector D1
clicks for a state originally prepared in |x−〉. We also
define a wrong detected events in X basis: Detector D1
clicks for a state originally prepared in state |x+〉 or de-
tector D0 clicks for a state originally prepared in |x−〉.
Asymptotically, we have the value of phase flip error rate
in Z basis by deducing error rate in X basis for set Fz
by
eph1 =
n˜+1 + n˜−0
n˜Z0 + n˜Z1
(11)
and n˜−0 = n˜Z0 − n˜+0.
worst-case analysis of key-rate dependent parameters for
coherent states We consider two random sets, cX and cZ .
Set cX contains NX pulse pairs from X basis. Set cZ
contains NZ pulses from set C, which contains all those
pulses of Z basis when Alice decides sending and Bob
decides not sending, and Alice decides not sending and
Bob decides sending. Denote NZ as the number of pulses
in set cZ . To apply the relation
eph1 =
n˜+1 + n˜−0
n˜Z0 + n˜Z1
, (12)
we need the condition
NZµe
−µ/2/2 = 2NXµe−µ. (13)
Observed data:
{nX0, nX1}; {nZ0, nZ1} (14)
where nX0, nX1: the number of clicks of detector D0, D1
due to pulse pairs from set cX ; nZ0, nZ1: number of clicks
of detector D0, D1 due to the pulses from set cZ .
Denote nZ = nZ0 + nZ1 to be the total counts due to
set cZ . Our goal is to formulate upper bound of e
ph
1 and
lower bound of n1 in eq.(20). There is a single-photon
subset c˜X in set cX . Due to this subset, we have the lower
bound value of number of counts of D0 (correct counts)
by
n˜+0 ≥ nX0 − Y 000NXe−µ −NX(1− e−µ − µe−µ). (15)
and upper bound value of D1 counts (wrong counts) by
n˜+1 ≤ nX1 − Y 100NXe−µ (16)
where Y k00(k = 0, 1) is the two-mode vacuum yield for
detector k clicking only. Consider c˜Z , a subset of cZ ,
containing all single-photon pulses from cZ . This sub-
set, if every single-photon pulse had been prepared in
X-basis, its wrong click number n˜−0 (number of wrong
clicks due to pulses originally prepared in coding state
|x−〉) is given by
n˜−0 = n˜Z0 − n˜+0. (17)
Denote the number of counts from set c˜Z to be n˜Z =
n˜Z0 + n˜Z1 where n˜Z0, n˜Z1 are number of counts of de-
tector D0, D1 respectively, due to pulses in set c˜Z . We
have
n˜Z ≥ (nZ0+nZ1)−NZ(1−e−µ/2−µe−µ/2/2)−Y00NZe−µ/2
(18)
where Y00 = Y
0
00 + Y
1
00, and we also have
eph1 =
n˜+1 + n˜−0
n˜Z
≤ nX1 + nZ0 − n˜+0
n˜Z
(19)
Given equations (15)(18)(19), we can calculate the key
rate by
Nf = n1 − n1H(eph1 )− ntfH(EZ) (20)
now, with
n1 = (n˜Z/NZ)NC (21)
and NC is the number of pulses in set C.
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